[ale] Fwd: Voting machines

[Phil Turmel]

I like your hash idea, with one tweak:  the hashing is done with a 
digital key that is *destroyed* after sufficient ballots are printed 
(registered voters plus some extra--extras destroyed on close of polls).

On 12/8/20 2:57 PM, Bruno Bronosky via Ale wrote:
> The paper ballot "fill in the bubble system" works fine as long as every 
> piece of paper has a signed hash and the voter walks away with that 
> hash. Using a touch screen machine for people who want/need it works 
> fine, as long as it prints a paper ballot that the user turns in. There 
> should be a very simple (online?) way for anyone with a serial number to 
> verify that their ballot was **counted**. If you want to "audit" your 
> ballot at any time, that state ought to be able to produce a container 
> that your ballot is known to be in and the totals for that container. It 
> would be possible for any GA high school graduate to walk away confident 
> that at least the container that holds their ballot contains exactly 
> what the label claims. The totals and a list of contained hashes would 
> be available to anyone who wants them. There would also be a list of who 
> has audited each container.
> 
> This solves:
> - Voters must not be able to be compelled to vote any specific way 
> (ballots are anonymous)
> - Ballots that go missing can be identified
> - Ballots that do not originate from the Authority can be identified
> - Ballots that are duplicated can be identified
> - Vote totals can be verified
> 
> All ballot hashes are produced from a digital key that only the 
> Authority (a single human) has access to. Ballots are only printed as 
> needed. The accountability falls on the Authority to ensure the security 
> of the ballots. That individual or someone in the chain of command will 
> face legal consequences for impropriety.
> 
> What am I missing?
> 
> 
> .!# BrunoBronosky #!.