[ale] Holy cow! Published in Slashdot!!
Tim Watts
tim at cliftonfarm.org
Wed Jan 2 21:18:34 EST 2013
Isn't the whole asymetric key security paradigm predicated on keeping
the private key, ya know, private? Lose that part and the jig is up.
On Wed, 2013-01-02 at 20:41 -0500, Scott Plante wrote:
> I think it might be hard, in my case anyway, to eliminate all the log
> files, /etc/hosts entries, .ssh/config entries, and other locations
> where good guesses on where to try hacked ssh keys.
>
>
> By the way, to answer my own question, it appears that you only need
> the private key half to brute force a ssh key, and this project
> (possibly among others?) will do it.
> http://www.leidecker.info/projects/phrasendrescher/index.shtml
> Therefore, there is no advantage to obfuscating your public keys or
> separating them from your private keys.
>
>
> Scott
>
> ______________________________________________________________________
> From: "Wolf Halton" <wolf.halton at gmail.com>
> To: "Atlanta Linux Enthusiasts" <ale at ale.org>
> Sent: Monday, December 31, 2012 7:45:18 PM
> Subject: Re: [ale] Holy cow! Published in Slashdot!!
>
> If you remove the human-readable user at server-example.com from the end
> of the keys in authorized_keys and maybe edit your history on the
> sending server, how will they know where to go, even if they are
> sitting at the console of your not-publicly-accessible workstation?
>
>
> I think authorized keys is the lesser evil. I also shell in through a
> vpn tunnel to most of my servers, so unless they know my keyring
> password, they cannot access any machines anyway.
>
>
>
> On Fri, Dec 28, 2012 at 11:37 AM, Scott Plante
> <splante at insightsys.com> wrote:
> Presumably you're using ssh-agent & ssh-add, not just creating
> keys without passphrases. Other than for some very limited
> accounts designed for cron tasks, I can't see a good reason
> for having ssh keys without a good passphrase. Then, even if
> your box gets compromised the keys can't be used without the
> passphrase (but you don't have to type it for each individual
> ssh command either!) I used ssh for years before bothering to
> learn how to set up ssh-agent/ssh-add. It's definitely made
> life easier. Since you don't have to type it as often, you can
> make a longer, more complex passphrase. I'd hate to type 16
> characters for every ssh/scp I have to do!
>
>
> Of course, once you have access to the public and private
> keys, the passphrase could be brute forced without connecting
> to the remote system, correct? In that sense, a passphrase is
> less secure than a password you use to connect to a remote
> system, as the remote system can detect incorrect guesses and
> lock the account. Does it make sense to keep your public keys
> separate from and not easily associated with your private
> keys, just in case your box does need get hacked? Do you need
> the public key to brute force the passphrase on a private key?
>
>
> Congrats, Charles!
>
>
> Scott
>
>
> ______________________________________________________________
> From: "James Sumners" <james.sumners at gmail.com>
> To: "Atlanta Linux Enthusiasts" <ale at ale.org>
> Sent: Thursday, December 27, 2012 2:27:27 PM
> Subject: Re: [ale] Holy cow! Published in Slashdot!!
>
>
> Hell with that. I create a new key for each system and add an
> entry to my ~/.ssh/config to use it. Thus, I use a unique key
> for each system and forget all about using a password to
> connect.
>
> On Thursday, December 27, 2012, Michael B. Trausch wrote:
> On 12/27/2012 09:18 AM, Charles Shapiro wrote:
> > A lifelong ambition is fulfilled... I make
> Slashdot's front page (
> >
> http://yro.slashdot.org/story/12/12/26/1459248/lax-ssh-key-management-a-big-problem
> > ) !!
> >
> > charlesTheLurker is me... I reckon it's time to
> update the ol' resume.
>
> Awesome! :-)
>
> Some of the comments on that article from people that
> claim to be in the
> field are a bit disturbing, though...
>
> Brings up an interesting point. Moving away from
> passwords to cached
> private keys is something that most people _do_ see as
> lesser security,
> despite the fact that when properly managed it
> provides far better
> security. I wonder how it is we're supposed to combat
> that problem.
> Education doesn't work; a lot of people's eyes glaze
> over if you try to
> explain to them how it provides superior security.
>
> --- Mike
>
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>
> --
> James Sumners
> http://james.roomfullofmirrors.com/
>
> "All governments suffer a recurring problem: Power attracts
> pathological personalities. It is not that power corrupts but
> that it is magnetic to the corruptible. Such people have a
> tendency to become drunk on violence, a condition to which
> they are quickly addicted."
>
> Missionaria Protectiva, Text QIV (decto)
> CH:D 59
>
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>
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>
>
> --
> Wolf Halton
> This Apt Has Super Cow Powers - http://sourcefreedom.com
> Open-Source Software in Libraries - http://FOSS4Lib.org
> Advancing Libraries Together - http://LYRASIS.org
> Apache Open Office Developer wolfhalton at apache.org
>
>
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