[ale] really really deleting files....
Keith R. Watson
keith.watson at gtri.gatech.edu
Tue Jun 24 12:28:43 EDT 2003
At 03:28 PM 6/18/2003 -0400, you wrote:
>Also do a search for "Peter Gutman" (SP?) He wrote a paper
>on permanently delting files. I think he wrote a few tools
>to do this.
>
>Dow Hurst wrote:
>>Check out the wipe package.
>>Dow
>>
>>John Wells wrote:
>>
>>>Any utilities out there that can do a low level delete of particular
>>>directory's contents?
>>>
>>>thanks guys.
>>>
>>>John
John,
It all depends on what you mean by erase. Most people mean that the typical
undelete tool won't be able to recover the file. There are a number of
tools that meet this requirement such as wipe (which Dow already mentioned).
http://abaababa.ouvaton.org/wipe/
However if you mean no one, not even a three letter government agency can
recover the data, then it is not possible to erase data so that it is
totally safe from recovery. (I'm sure that will start a flame war) The real
issue is how do you define the terms erase and recoverable:
Erase - 1. The media is destroyed in such a manner that magnetic domains no
longer exist that can store data.
2. The media is bulk erased in a manner that all magnetic domains in
usable and unusable areas are randomized. (this would generally
require disassembly of a hard drive and degaussing with a *very*
strong field). In the case of a hard drive the media would not
be reusable unless timing marks were re-written at the factory.
3. The data is overwritten or obfuscated in usable areas of the media
but the it is still usable for data storage. Unusable areas may
still contain data.
Recoverable - 1. Your data can't be reassembled and viewed by an un-authorized
party regardless of the level of effort required (The NSA
couldn't do it with unlimited funds)
2. The level of effort required is more difficult than the vague
notions of recoverability most people have in mind.
If you use definition #3 of erase and #2 of recoverable then data is
recoverable.
As evidence for my point, I offer the following papers on data recovery and
security from:
Peter Gutmann
Department of Computer Science
University of Auckland
http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/
A paper on the Secure Deletion of Data from Magnetic and Solid-State Memory,
http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/pubs/secure_del.html
which exposes a number of myths about the deletion of data, shows how data
can be recovered long after it should have been erased, and indicates a
method of erasure that should make it a considerable challenge to recover
any deleted data. This paper was presented at the 1996 Usenix Security
Symposium, but you had to attend the conference to see the cool colour
slides of supposedly overwritten disk data which wasn't really overwritten
(they were too big to fit in the paper itself).
The follow up to this paper, published in August 2001, which looks at Data
Remanence in Semiconductor Devices,
http://www.cryptoapps.com/~peter/usenix01.pdf
specifically remanence issues in static and dynamic RAM, CMOS circuitry,
and EEPROMs and flash memory. This paper was presented at the 2001 Usenix
Security Symposium, the slides for the talk
http://www.cryptoapps.com/~peter/usenix01_slides.pdf
provide a quick overview of the issues, although for real understanding you
should read the full paper.
You hear the term DOD wipe used quite a bit. The following papers will
explain just what the DOD means by that:
A Guide to Understanding Data Remanence in Automated Information Systems
http://www.radium.ncsc.mil/tpep/library/rainbow/NCSC-TG-025.2.html
or
http://www.fas.org/irp/nsa/rainbow/tg025-2.htm
A Guide To Understanding Object Reuse In Trusted Systems
http://www.radium.ncsc.mil/tpep/library/rainbow/NCSC-TG-018.html
or
http://www.fas.org/irp/nsa/rainbow/tg018.htm
The only way to erase data securely using definition #1 of erase and #1 of
recoverable is to sand blast or grind the oxide off the disk platters, or
melt the disk platters. This is generally considered excessive by most
people because they're using definition # 3 of erase and #2 of recoverable.
The bottom line is that one should select their methods based on knowledge
rather than vague ideas. If the vendors lips are moving, they're lying so
pick a wipe program carefully (Note sections 5.1.1 and 6.3 of "A Guide to
Understanding Data Remanence in Automated Information Systems").
I'm not aware of any published tests comparing the quality of wipe programs
(in light of section 6.3 of "A Guide to Understanding Data Remanence in
Automated Information Systems"). If you know of one, please let me know.
keith
-------------
Keith R. Watson GTRI/ITD
Systems Support Specialist III Georgia Tech Research Institute
keith.watson at gtri.gatech.edu Atlanta, GA 30332-0816
404-894-0836
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