[ale] [OT] Inside A U.S. Election Vote Counting Program

Transam bob at verysecurelinux.com
Wed Jul 9 22:55:33 EDT 2003


On Wed, Jul 09, 2003 at 02:14:03PM -0400, Joe Steele wrote:
> Since the issue of electronic voting security has been discussed on 
> the ale list in the past, I forward the following link for anyone 
> interested who has not seen it yet.

> http://www.blackboxvoting.com/scoop/S00065.htm

This article is shocking!  This process is so incredibly vulnerable to
massive changing of votes by anybody without scruples (easy to find around
politicians) that it is both outrageous and, I think, unconstitutional.

There is, essentially, no audit trail nor any reliable way to go back
to the "original data" to check for tallying errors.  The fact that the
default password is published is yet another level of vulnerability.

Also, it is trivial for someone to slip in a Trojaned version of Access
or for it just to screw up due to a bug.  Hmmm.  What if it was in use
in 2000?  Gore was anti-Microsoft and Bush pro-Microsoft.  Would Microsoft
have provided an Access "update" that had a Trojan in it to move a certain
percentage of Gore votes to Bush?  Talk about being above the law!

> --Joe

Bob

"Microsoft: Unsafe at any clock speed!"
   -- Bob Toxen 10/03/2002
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